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Public Values in the Right Context
Kian Mintz-Woo
University Center for Human Values, Princeton University
ABSTRACT
I am sympathetic to Avner de Shalit’s position that a political philosophy should
incorporate public values, but I see their role differently. Philosophers of science
standardly distinguish between values being introduced in the context of discovery
(inputs into the investigation or arguments) and in the context of justification
(acceptance or rejection of substantive claims in light of the arguments or
investigation). I argue that de Shalit is wrong to put the public values in the
context of discovery; with respect to normative theories (such as political theories),
the values should be introduced in the context of justification.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 28 January 2020; Accepted 28 January 2020
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Locking ourselves in an ivory tower is a problem. As Avner de Shalit [2021] draws
attention to, despite the commitment many political philosophers have to democratic
institutions, political philosophers seldom appeal to the demos themselves. This seems
problematic; if these philosophers are normatively committed to institutions which
privilege public values, why are the public not incorporated into the process of political
philosophy itself? However, while I agree that there is a problem such that these public
appeals are merited, I disagree with de Shalit about their place. In doing so, I sketch an
important contrast between scientific and normative theories.
To set the stage, consider a distinction influential in the philosophy of science: the
difference between the context of discovery and the context of justification. This
‘context distinction’ was introduced by Hans Reichenbach of the Berlin Circle to indi-
cate parts of the (idealised) scientific process. Roughly speaking, the context of discov-
ery involves investigating phenomena and gathering evidence while the context of
justification involves the logical processes of linking the evidence to conclusions or
the construction of arguments for substantive conclusions.1 While there are both
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1 Perhaps de Shalit has some version of this distinction in mind when he writes that an ecologist can investigate
in ‘a perfectly scientific manner even if her motivation has to do with the decline in the population of bees and
her inspiration is derived from reading reports by farmers that there are fewer and fewer bees in their fields’ [de
Shalit 2021: XXX]. This is the kind of idea that motivates the distinction; values can be—perhaps must be—
involved in hypothesis generation and choice of project, but the analysis of data should be value-free (‘per-
fectly scientific’).
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objections to the distinction [Nickles 1985] and controversies about how to understand
it [Shickore and Steinle 2006], it has provided a basis for discussion in philosophy of
science throughout much of the twentieth century [Hoyningen-Huene 1987]. While de
Shalit does not appeal to this distinction, I believe using it to understand the process of
theory choice provides both clarity for his own view and a framework to explain the
contrasts with my own view.
The method that de Shalit suggests to incorporate public values is to consult the
public and use the results as inputs into theoretical consideration, in what he calls
‘public reflective equilibrium’. In terms of the context distinction, starting with
public values instead of the theorists’ own is analogous to including public values in
the context of discovery (i.e. during hypothesis creation or evidence gathering). In con-
trast, I will defend the claim that public values should come in at the point of political
theory comparison or selection, a point in the process analogous to the context of
evaluation (i.e. during the choice of whether to adopt particular substantive claims
or conclusions). Indeed, I believe that this could be generalised and that the place
for public values is in the context of discovery for normative theorizing in general.
My first objection to de Shalit’s position is his suggested method does not accom-
plish his own goals: trying to meet people in ‘a manner which is as random as possible’
is not a rigorous way to come to understand the political values which shape our insti-
tutions. His method would be neither representative nor systematic. What we would
need instead is rigorous analysis of the values and—importantly—the extent of their
influence, neither of which is achievable by philosophers asking random people they
meet normative questions. However, I believe that de Shalit would be unreceptive to
changing his method to a more systematic alternative like representative sampling.
That is because such changes would compromise other goals of his; resultant responses
would be very coarse-grained and would not admit of Socratic interaction.
Sometimes, de Shalit lowers the ambition of his methodological goals by suggesting
that the intention is merely to ‘inspire’ normative theorizing or to guarantee that the
theories ‘relate to’ public institutions and their justifications. These desiderata are
much less demanding than trying to determine what values shape shared institutions.
However, these minimal desiderata could be met in all kinds of ways: most obviously,
one could come to understand the theories, such as they are, behind public institutions
by interviewing or reading interviews with influential politicians and stakeholders. One
could even be inspired by reading science fiction or fantasy literature (both of which
contain stellar examples of theories of social change and political theory). These will
still be less systematic than the social science approach to discovering the views of poli-
ties, of course.
However, even if de Shalit were to systematise his suggested method so that the
inputs were properly reflective of the public at issue, I would still have a second,
more fundamental objection to his method: it unduly limits the importance of
public values by restricting them to inputs. This objection will require some unpacking.
In order to do so, I will construct a version of his argument and then explain how his
solution is unsatisfactory. While I am framing this in a somewhat different manner to
de Shalit, I believe these claims to be wholly consistent with his picture.
First, we could grant to de Shalit that normative theorizing, of which political the-
orizing is a species, requires appeal to values. This contrasts with science, since science,
unlike normative theorizing, is built on an empirical basis. In this sense, we can say that
normative theorizing grants space for legitimate disagreement without the possibility
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of demonstrable falsehood and that this is unlike a standard picture of scientific
reasoning.
One way of thinking about this is that normative theorizing often takes place within,
or makes fundamental appeals to, first-order normative theories such as deontology,
virtue ethics, or consequentialism. Roughly speaking, such first-order normative the-
ories adopt or draw attention to certain aspects of the moral world (we can be inclusive
by saying that particularist theories draw attention to all of the aspects). This is a sche-
matic simplification, but it helps illustrate the actual heterogeneous landscape of nor-
mative starting points.
Insofar as this is the case, and assuming that there is space for reasonable disagree-
ment when choosing among first-order normative theories, normative theorizing takes
place against some background values. There is, in this manner, an unavoidable appeal
to some normative values [Mintz-Woo 2021].
Let us grant his claim that the values of political philosophers should not be privi-
leged in this process, either for practical reasons (arguments are more readily appli-
cable or more convincing when addressing shared assumptions) or for theoretical
reasons (some are sceptical that the substantive values of philosophers are more
likely to be true simply due to their profession). On whichever basis we grant or
accept his claim, we see an important difference between normative theorizing (as
in the case of political philosophy) and non-normative reasoning (as in the case of
scientific reasoning): while the non-normative evidence is (perhaps) properly the
domain of scientists, normative values seem to be not particularly limited to normative
theorists. This distinction could explain de Shalit’s intuition that political philosophy
differs from other philosophical areas:
when a metaphysical or philosophy of mind question is at stake, most people have no idea what
to think about it, whereas when a political philosophy question is at stake, most people have an
opinion and do reason about it. [de Shalit 2021: XXX]
Whether normative discussions should include the public is a live debate, and it is dis-
cussed by many, including in attached commentaries. However, I am going to grant to
de Shalit arguendo the point that the values of political philosophers may not have a
privileged role and consider solutions.
His solution is to bring those values in at the ground level by randomly talking to
people in society. However, this does not play to the strengths of the philosopher (or at
least to many philosophers)—few of us have the wit and wisdom of Socrates, say; the
strength of the philosopher lies in forming valid arguments and in drawing surprising
conclusions. An additional challenge is that is it not clear who counts as part of society.
However, the most important objection to this solution is that these public values
are only brought in as considerations that enter into the theorizing, that is, as
inputs. That artificially limits their importance in the public reflective equilibrium
process. Instead, the more systematic—and less contingent—method is one where
the philosophers produce arguments and make them available, but where the argu-
ments are not evaluated by philosophers (alone) but the public. Philosophers generate
and publish these arguments, but it is up to both decision-makers and the public to
evaluate the arguments.
On this model, political philosophers work out the implications of various theories
(and principles)—whether they accept those theories or not. Other political philoso-
phers determine whether the suggested implications do indeed follow from the
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theories under consideration. Some of these implications may be found to be consist-
ent with pretheoretical intuitions and others may be found to be, to a greater or lesser
extent, counterexamples. For instance, some may draw implications about political
inclusion of non-human animals by expanding the scope of fundamental rights
[Donaldson and Kymlicka 2012] and some may draw implications for climate policies
from normative principles about global commons problems [Mintz-Woo 2018]. It is
up to other normative theorists to determine whether these putative implications actu-
ally follow. If they do follow, it will be up to others—including the public—to see
whether these packages of theories plus implications support or undermine the under-
lying theories, including in comparison to other packages.2
This is therefore also a version of public reflective equilibrium, but less limited than
de Shalit’s model (we could call it public final reflective equilibrium); the public is able
not only to enter into the equilibrium by evaluating the premises, but by considering
the weight of the arguments as a whole. We should expect there to be value-laden
things to say about conclusions as well as premises in the context of justification
and—more importantly—we should expect there to be interesting things to say
about arguments when evaluated in juxtaposition to each other. What looks like a
strong argument from some first-order normative premises might look relatively
unmotivated or implausible compared to another. Or we might find that different
arguments converge on similar conclusions, something which should strengthen our
credence in those conclusions; recognising this is not so easily achieved by only con-
sidering what follows from a given set of pre-existing (public) values.
One objection to this is that if the public values are brought in the context of jus-
tification only, then in fact we will get arguments that are grounded in first-order nor-
mative theories which are of interest to, or considered plausible by, political
philosophers.3 It is very likely that these theories may diverge greatly from political
views held by the public. If philosophers are not working with a representative
group of theories, they may generate a biased distribution of arguments. While I
have advocated bringing in those values in the context of justification only, I have
two responses to his objection. The first is that it is not necessary for the distribution
of arguments to reflect their prevalence in the public to perform this justificatory
process. As long as all plausible positions are in contention, it does not matter
whether some have been worked out in their implications more than others, since
we can still evaluate a given set of packages of theories plus implications against
another. Indeed, I suspect that including the public in the context of justification
would help prune some of the more outré principles that philosophers endorse—as
more philosophers point to more and more implications of a given theory, the poten-
tial counterexamples often mount in such a way that what was initially merely counter-
intuitive becomes straightforwardly absurd, at least for a non-philosopher evaluating
that theory.
However, someone worried about this might respond that not including the public
in the context of discovery could lead to some theories not being in contention. If the
view is not even considered, then it cannot be evaluated in the context of justification;
this would be extremely costly if the view was plausibly true! Here, I think we enter a
theoretical trade-off. The question is how much theoretical space is unexplored if we
2 Thanks to Ewan Kingston for written comments on these points.
3 I want to thank Liam Kofi Bright for discussion on this point.
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do not talk to the public before drawing implications versus how much extra cost is
involved in involving the public in the context of discovery. My personal view is
that most of the views considered by the public will be discussed in the general philo-
sophical discussion, even if less usually endorsed among philosophers, so not too much
theoretical information is lost by not incorporating the public in the context of discov-
ery. Taking my stand also comes with the theoretical simplicity of involving the public
at only one point—albeit a more important point. However, I am somewhat agnostic
on whether to include the public in both contexts as opposed to only the context of
justification since the gains and losses in this trade-off may be ultimately turn on
empirical information. What I am committed to is that they should be involved in
the context of justification.
While de Shalit is concerned that philosophers respond mostly to each other, my
suggested model takes intersubjective agreement as a strength and removes intersub-
jective disagreement as a barrier. There is nothing inconsistent with various theorists
working from or with different first-order normative theories. In fact, a theorist can
work with premises that she takes to be suspect in order to tease out whether her
worries really follow from the theory under consideration. Focusing on values held
by others limits the potential scope for fruitful and creative arguments. Obviously,
this is not to gainsay the minimal claim that inspiration can come from random citi-
zens. However, inspiration can come from anywhere, and I am disagreeing that there is
a special place for inspiration from random citizens. Most importantly, I am endorsing
the philosophy of science conclusion that the context of discovery should (or at least
legitimately can) be driven by the interests of the theorists. In short, wherever a theorist
thinks she can show that a particular theory has a surprising conclusion, she should do
so, whether that argument is based on theories she endorses or her interlocuters
endorse or random citizens endorse or whatever may be the case. But limiting her
basis for theorising to public values, I suggest, is both undermotivated and arbitrarily
narrow.
This also generates several interesting distinctions between normative theorizing
and scientific reasoning. First, scientific theorizing does not involve this kind of
public appeal at the point of evaluation; if the conclusions are validly drawn from
the evidence, we do not think the evidence is subject to reasonable disagreement in
the way that first-order normative theories may be. Roughly speaking, this could be
justified by the intuition that, if the evidence is empirical, it does not make sense for
the layperson to dispute it. In contrast, if the ‘evidence’ is first-order normative
theory, it may well be a reasonable subject of disagreement.
Second, many of the empiricists who endorsed the context distinction were con-
cerned about values appearing in the context of justification. They thought, as de
Shalit may mean when he writes ‘a perfectly scientific manner’, that justification
should be done without involving the values of the scientist. Some thought that the jus-
tification process would, ideally, be purely formal or logical.
In contrast, when considering normative theories, there is less reason to think that
justification is a purely formal or logical process. Political and other normative theories
should be considered in conjunction with each other, both because choosing theories
involves substantive evaluation of the theories, but also values in weighing theoretical
commitments contained within one theory against another.
There are two upshots to this proposal. The first is that we can see a way of incor-
porating public values where they are both (a) necessary and (b) contested, but
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informed by philosophical argumentation and rigour. Instead of making the theorist
the ultimate arbiter of the reflective equilibrium process, this makes the theories
open to public evaluation. The second is that it inverts the traditional philosophy of
science conclusion, which is that contexts of discovery must be value-laden and
need to incorporate values but that contexts of justification ideally are not value-
laden. In normative reasoning, we get an interesting inversion from empirical reason-
ing, where—even in the ideal case—justification should involve public values.
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